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Abstract
In this paper, a new mathematical formulation for the problem of de-anonymizing social network users by
actively querying their membership in social network groups is introduced. In this formulation, the attacker
has access to a noisy observation of the group membership of each user in the social network. When an
unidentified victim visits a malicious website, the attacker uses browser history sniffing to make queries
regarding the victim’s social media activity. Particularly, it can make polar queries regarding the victim’s
group memberships and the victim’s identity. The attacker receives noisy responses to her queries. The goal
is to de-anonymize the victim with the minimum number of queries. Starting with a rigorous mathematical
model for this active de-anonymization problem, an upper bound on the attacker’s expected query cost
is derived, and new attack algorithms are proposed which achieve this bound. These algorithms vary in
computational cost and performance. The results suggest that prior heuristic approaches to this problem
provide sub-optimal solutions.
I. Introduction
With the rapid development of information technology, the internet has become an integral part of our
daily lives. User anonymity is arguably one of the most critical aspects of the cyberspace. Not only is
anonymity a preference of the users, but it is also necessary to ensure data security and to shield users from
data-stealing attacks.
Social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn and the social data which they encompass
find applications in academic research, government, business, and healthcare [1]. As a result of the massive
DRAFT
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
04
16
3v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
1 O
ct 
20
17
2amount of personal data stored in these networks, de-anonymization attacks using social networks has been
a subject of great interest in recent years [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
The active de-anonymization problem - first proposed in [2] - considers a scenario where a victim visits
a malicious website controlled by the attacker. The attacker wishes to find the victim’s real-world identity.
In [2], it is shown that by scanning the social network and then using browser history sniffing, the attacker
can infer the victim’s social media activity. Particularly, the attacker uses two sources of information for
de-anonymization:
1) Prior partial information regarding the network graph, which is a bipartite graph containing information
regarding the user’s group memberships. The graph consists of a i) a set of user nodes, ii) a set of group
nodes, and iii) a set of edges connecting users to the groups in which they are members.
2) Responses to online queries sent to the victim’s device. These queries can be divided into two categories:
• User identity (UID): A UID query asks if the unknown victim uJ is user ui in the network. For instance,
if the attacker is using browser history sniffing, then the query would return a “yes" if the victim signed
into the social network under the specific account. In general, the response could have both false positives
and negatives.
• group Membership Queries (GM): A GM asks if the unknown victim uJ is a member of the group r j
. For instance, in browser history sniffing, the attacker verifies whether the victim visited the group’s
URL or not.
The attack strategy in [2] is to sweep over all groups in the social networks and to create a group membership
signature for the victim. Then, the attacker intersects the members of groups which the victim is a member
of, hence greatly reducing the number of candidates for de-anonymization. The attacker then sends UID
queries regarding every member of the intersection until it finds a match in the victim’s browser history at
which point the attack terminates. Although the effectiveness of the attack on real-world social networks has
been illustrated in [2], given the lack of rigorous analysis, it is not clear whether and how the performance
of the attack compares with the optimal performance. The first contribution of this work is to construct a
mathematical framework for de-anonymization attacks. In our model, the group memberships in the social
network are modeled by a random bipartite graph. This graph is called the social network graph. An example
of a social network graph is illustrated in Figure 1. It is assumed that the victim’s index is chosen randomly
and uniformly from the set of user indices [1,m]. We note that the active attack in [2] does not exploit
friendship relationship’s between users and thus we do not
model these relationships in the social network graph. The attacker wants to reveal the victim’s index, and
has access to a noisy version of the social network graph. This models the attacker’s knowledge of the social
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Fig. 1: The figure illustrates the social network graph. The graph consists of two sets of nodes: i) the user
nodes {u1, u2, · · · , um}, and ii) the group nodes {r1, r2, · · · , rn}. An edge between user ui and group r j signifies
the membership of ui in r j.
network prior to the active phase of the attack (i.e. before the victim visits the attacker’s website). During the
active phase of the attack, the attacker makes queries regarding the victim’s group memberships and receives
noisy responses to these queries. The noise models private groups in the network which are inaccessible to
the attacker as well as limited access to user history due to browser security or due to limited cache space.
The goal is to design algorithms for reliable de-anonymization which require the minimum expected number
of queries possible.
Our second contribution is the design and analysis of several new de-anonymization strategies which leads
to upper bounds on the expected number queries required for de-anonymization. Specifically, we show that
it is possible to have the expected total number of queries and the expected number of group membership
queries both grow logarithmically in the number of users where the expectation is taken over all social
network graphs and user indices. Hence, the attack strategy in [2], in which the attacker queries every group
in the network is sub-optimal if the number of groups grows super-logarithmically in the number of users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we explain the problem formulation. In Section
III, we investigate the new attack strategies for the active de-anonymization problem. We find upper bound
to the expected number of queries resulting from each of these strategies. Finally, Section V concludes the
paper.
II. Problem Formulation
In this section, we introduce the notation and problem formulation. We model the group memberships in
the social network by a bipartite graph g0.
Definition 1. A bipartite graph g0 consists of a triple of sets (U0,R0,E0). The vertices in the graph are
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Fig. 2: The figure illustrates the components of the active de-anonymization problem. Initially, the dashed-
dotted components generate the graph pair (g0, g1). At time t, the attacker sends the query Xt to the network.
Xt is a function of (g1,Y t−1). Then, the network generates Zt to the attacker, where Zt is a function of g0. Zt
is corrupted by noise and the attacker receives the noisy output Yt.
partitioned into two sets: 1) the user set U0 = {u1, u2, · · · , um}, and 2) the group set R0 = {r1, r2, · · · , rn}.
The set of edges is denoted by E0 ⊂ {(i, j)|i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n]}.
If (i, j) ∈ E0, we say that ‘user ui is in group r j’. The set of members of the group r j is denoted by E0j =
{i|(i, j) ∈ E0}, j ∈ [1, n]. The set of groups associated with user i is defined as F 0i = { j|(i, j) ∈ E0}, i ∈ [1,m].
The group signature of user i is the vector F i = (Fi,1, Fi,2, · · · , Fi,n), where
Fi,k =

1 if ui ∈ E0k ,
0 otherwise.
That is, the group signature is the n-length binary vector for which the jth element is 1 if and only if ui is a
member of the group r j. The vector F
n2
j,n1
= (F j,n1 , F j,n1+1, · · · , F j,n2) is called a partial group signature of the
jth user, where 1 ≤ n1 < n2 ≤ n.
Example 1. In the Facebook social network, U0 is the set of users and R0 is the group set which includes
the pages/ events/ groups/ applications on the social network. An edge between user i and group j indicates
that user i is a member of group j. Here, the groups of interest are those whose member lists are publicly
available.
For simplicity, we assume that the set of edges E0 is generated randomly with edge probability p. More
precisely, let E0 be a Bernoulli random variable with PE0(1) = p. Then, the probability that user i is in group
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P(E0 = E0) =
∏
(i, j)∈[1,m]×[1,n]
PE0
(
1
(
(i, j) ∈ E0
))
.
Generally, it is assumed that the attacker has access to a noisy version of the graph g0 which we denote by
g1 [6]. The noise is assumed to have a specific ‘single-edge’ structure. The presence of any edge (i, j) in the
graph g1 depends only on its presence in the graph g0 and is independent of all other edges. Formally, let
E1 be a binary random variable with the following distribution conditioned on E0:
PE1 |E0(α|β) =

1 − e1 if α = 1, β = 1,
e1 if α = 0, β = 1,
e2 if α = 1, β = 0,
1 − e2 if α = 0, β = 0,
(1)
where e1, e2 ∈ [0, 1]. The attacker has access to the graph g1 which is characterized by (U0,R0,E1) where
Pr(E1 = E1|E0 = E0) =
∏
(i, j)∈[1,m]×[1,n]
PE1 |E0 (1 ((i, j) ∈ E1) |1 ((i, j) ∈ E0)) .
The group signature of user i in g1 is denoted by F̂ i. The partial group signature corresponding to the first
n′ ∈ N groups is denoted by F̂n′i,1.
Example 2. One way for the attacker to discover the bipartite graph in the Facebook social network is by
scanning the network [2]. In practice, the attacker observes a subset of the true group memberships/interests
of users. For instance some users choose to keep their membership in certain groups private. In other words,
the attacker samples the graph g0. The sampled graph g1 is characterized by (U0,R0,E1) where
Pr(E1 = E1|E0 = E0) = 1(E1 ⊂ E0)s|E1 |1 (1 − s1)|E
0−E1 |. (2)
Comparing Equations (1) and (2), it follows that in this instance of the problem, e1 = s1 and e2 = 0. This
can be interpreted as follows: Each edge (i, j) in E0 is included in E1 with probability s1 and it is omitted
with probability 1 − s1. The sampled graph represents the attacker’s ‘knowledge’ of the graph g0.
It is assumed that a user index J is chosen randomly based on a probability distribution PJ on the set
of user indices [1,m]. In this work, we assume that PJ is the uniform distribution. The attacker’s goal is to
determine the realization of J. The attacker may make two forms of queries, 1) UID: Is J equal to j for
some j ∈ [1,m]?, and 2) GM: Is user uJ in group ri for some i ∈ [1, n]? . Equivalently, the attacker may
inquire about the value of FJ,i, i ∈ [1, n], or it can inquire about the value of the indicator function 1(J = j).
After the t’th query, the attacker receives a binary response zt, where 1 indicates a ‘yes’ and 0 indicates a
‘no’ response.
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Definition 2. An attack strategy for the pair of graphs (g0, g1) is defined as a sequence of functions xt :
{0, 1}(t−1) → R0 ∪U0, t ∈ N.
In the above definition, at the tth step the attack strategy provides a mapping xt from the vector of prior
responses received by the attacker y(t−1)1 to the set of all possible queries. We often write xt to represent
xt(y1, y2, · · · , yt−1) which is the tth query. Furthermore, we call xt a group query if xt ∈ U0, otherwise if
xt ∈ R0, we call xt a UID query.
At step t, the attacker transmits a symbol xt from the set R0 ⋃U0. The network outputs a response zt as
defined below:
zt =

1 if xt = ri, J ∈ E0ri or xt = uJ ,
0 Otherwise.
In general, the attacker receives a noisy response to its queries. In this work, we assume that the responses
to group membership queries are corrupted by noise, whereas for UID queries, the response is received
noiselessly. This assumption simplifies the error analysis for the proposed schemes. As a result, if xt ∈ U0,
then the attacker receives yt, where yt is the output of a binary channel characterized by PY |Z which is given
below:
PY |Z(α|β) =

1 − f1, if α = 1, β = 1,
f1, if α = 0, β = 1,
f2, if α = 1, β = 0,
1 − f2, if α = 0, β = 0,
(3)
where f1, f2 ∈ [0, 1].
Example 3. In [2], it is assumed that the attacker uses the user’s cached history to find the answers to its
queries. Since the cached data is limited, some queries might result in false negatives. In this formulation,
yt is the output of a binary z-channel with parameter s2 ∈ [0, 1] and input zt. In the form of Equation (3),
f1 = s2 and f2 = 0.
The following defines a measure on the performance of an attack strategy:
Definition 3. For an attack strategy characterized by xt(yt−11 ), t ∈ N, we define the number of queries Q ,
min{t|(xt, yt) = (uJ , 1)}.
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given attack strategy, the expected number of queries is said to be O(g(m)) if
lim sup
m→∞
E(Q)
g(m)
≤ ∞,
where the expectation is taken over the user indices J, and over the sets of edges (E0,E1).
Definition 4. The minimum expected number of queries is defined as
Q¯ , min
xt:{0,1}(t−1)→R0∪U0,t∈N
E(Q)
.
We are interested in finding upper bounds to the value of Q¯ as a function of the number of groups n, the
number of users m, edge probabilities p, and noise transition probabilities PE1 |E0 and PY |Z .
III. Expected Number of Queries: Bounds and Achievable Strategies
In this section, we provide constructive upper bounds on the minimum expected number of queries, Q¯. We
describe three different strategies and derive an upper bound based on each of them. The first two strategies
are analyzed for the noiseless case (i.e. ei = fi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}.). The first strategy, called the group intersection
strategy (GIS), builds upon the work in [2]. The second strategy, called the maximum posteriori probabilities
(MAP) strategy, has lower expected number of queries than the GIS. The third strategy is called the typical
set strategy (TSS) uses typical set ideas from information theory [7]. We analyze the performance of this
strategy for general ei and fi.
A. Group Intersection Strategy (GIS)
The group attack strategy (GIS) is based on [2]. In [2], the attacker first sends all possible GM queries,
and intersects the groups for which the query responses were positive, then it sends UID queries for each
member of the intersection to de-anonymize the user. In contrast, in the GIS, the attacker first chooses a
subset of groups in the network. It then finds the user’s partial group signature corresponding to the groups
in this set by sending GM queries. In the second step, similar to [2], the attacker intersects the groups in
this subset for which the query responses were positive. Similar to [2], The attacker conducts a brute-force
search over this smaller user set by sending UID queries.
We proceed by formally characterizing the algorithm. The attack consists of two steps: 1) the GM query
step, and 2) the UID query step. The following describes the the first step. The attacker has access to g0
which is characterized by (U0,R0,E0). Initially, a subset of size n′ of the groups is selected uniformly
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at random from the set R0, where n′ ∈ [1, n]. Let the indices of the sets in the collection be denoted by
{i1, i2, · · · , in′}. Then, the attacker finds the partial group signature corresponding to this set. This is done by
transmitting xt = rit , t = 1, 2, · · · , n′. Once the transmission is complete, the attacker reduces the graph by
eliminating all users which are not a member of the intersection
⋂
it:zt=1 E0it . The new graph g1 is characterized
by (U1,R1,E1), where
U1 =
⋂
it:zt=1
E0it ,
R1 = {r j|∃ui ∈ U1, ui ∈ E0j},
E1 = {( j, k)|( j, k) ∈ E0, j ∈ U1}.
Let U1 = {ui1 , ui2 , · · · , uil}. In the second step, which consists of the UID queries, the attacker transmits
xn′+ j = rn+i j , j ∈ [1, l] until it receives zn′+ j = 1. It announces the index i j as the user’s index. The GIS
algorithm is given in Figure 3.
The number of queries made in this attack is denoted by QGIS . We proceed to analyze the performance
of the strategy when ei = fi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, we analyze the performance assuming that the attacker
has full knowledge of the network, and the responses to the queries are received noiselessly, hence zt = yt
and g0 = g1.
The following theorem provides bounds on the expected number of queries required in the GIS algorithm.
Theorem 1. For the GIS strategy, we have:
E(QGIS ) = n′ + cm(1 − p + p2)n′ + O(1), (4)
where c = O(
√
n′) and n′ ≤ n. If
n′ =
 1p(1 − p) + 1log2 11−p
 log2 m, (5)
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(
1
p(1−p) +
1
log2
1
1−p
)
log2 m + O(1) holds, which implies
lim sup
m→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣E(QGIS ) −
 1p(1 − p) + 1log2 11−p
 log2 m
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < ∞.
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix. 
B. Maximum a Posteriori (MAP)
In the maximum a posteriori probabilities (MAP) attack strategy, the attacker first determines a partial
group signature of the user uJ based on a subset of n′ groups which are chosen randomly and uniformly
from the set of all groups, where n′ ≤ n, by sending n′ group queries and then uses the maximum likelihood
posterior probabilities to find the index J by sending additional UID queries.
The MAP attack strategy consists of two steps. In the first step, the attacker makes queries regarding the
values of FJ,k, k ∈ [1, n′] (or, equivalently, any n′ randomly picked groups). That is, it transmits the first n′
symbols in R0 one by one. It receives the partial group signature Fn′J,1. Here, n′ is assumed to be arbitrary. We
show that for asymptotically large n, if n′ is higher than a specific threshold, the attacker de-anonymizes the
user’s identity without any further queries with high probability. Whereas, if n′ is lower than the threshold,
further UID queries are required.
In the second step, the attacker calculates the posteriori probabilities for each of the users. Let
li = Pr(J = i|z1, z2, · · · , zn′), i ∈ [1,m].
Let l(i1) ≥ l(i2) ≥ · · · ≥ l(im) be the order statistics corresponding to the vector of random variables (l1, l2, · · · , lm).
At the (n′+t)th step, the attacker makes a UID query on whether the user index is equal to i(t). In other words,
it transmits xn′+t = rn+(it), t ∈ [1,m]. The algorithms ends when the attacker receives the output zn′+t = 1. In
summary, the attack strategy can be characterized as:
xt =

rt if t ∈ [1, n′],
ul(it )−n′ otherwise.
We analyze the performance of the strategy when ei = fi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. The MAP algorithm for the
noiseless de-anonymization problem simplifies to the one given in Figure 4. In the noiseless regime, after
receiving the partial group signature the users are divided into two subsets. Users who have the same partial
signature as the one that is received are equally likely with a non-zero probability, whereas users which
have a different partial signature have zero probability. Hence, the noiseless MAP is an extension of GIS
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Fig. 4: The MAP Algorithm
where the attacker uses all of the entries of the response vector instead of only using positive responses. The
number of queries in the MAP strategy is denoted by QMAP. The following theorem provides bounds on the
expected number of queries for this attack strategy when ei and fi are equal to 0.
Theorem 2. For the MAP strategy, if ei = fi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, then:
E(QMAP) = n′ +
cm
2
(1 + 2p2 − 2p)n′ + O(1), (6)
where c = O(
√
n′) and n′ ≤ n.
If n′ = 1
λ
log2 m, where λ > − log2 (p2 + (1 − p)2), then E(QMAP) ≤ 1λ log2 m + O(
√
log2 m).This implies,
lim sup
m→∞
∣∣∣E(QMAP) − 1λ log2 m∣∣∣√
log2 m
< ∞. (7)
Proof. Please refer to the appendix. 
Remark 1. Note that taking n′ = γ log2 m, γ > 1λ in the proof of Theorem 2 gives
cm
2 (p
2 + (1− p)2)n′ → 0 as
m→ ∞. Hence, for this choice of n′, as the number of users (and groups) increases, the number of queries
after finding the group signature is negligible. So, the number of queries converges to n′. The probability
that the resulting partial group signature is unique approaches one as m→ ∞. This follows by the Markov
inequality:
P(@!i : F′ = Fn
′
i,1) = P(|L| > 1) ≤ E(|L|)→ 0,
where L is the set of users with non-zero probability after receiving the responses to the GM queries.
C. Typical Set Strategy (TSS)
The TSS is an attack strategy which is based on typical sets. We provide bounds on the performance
of the TSS for arbitrary ei and fi. We prove that in this strategy, the expected number of queries grows
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logarithmically with respect to the number of users for any fixed ei and fi. We also show that the TSS
strategy outperforms both the MAP strategy as well as the GIS in terms of expected number of queries when
ei = fi = 0.
We use the standard definitions for typical and conditional typical sets [7]. For completeness the definitions
are given below.
Definition 5. For a random variable X defined on the probability space (X, 2X, PX), where X is a finite set,
and n ∈ N, and  > 0, the typical set is defined as
An (X) =
{
xn
∣∣∣1
n
|N(a|xn) − PX(a)| ≤ ,∀a ∈ X},
where N(a|xn) = ∑ni=1 1(xi = a).
The conditional typical set is defined below.
Definition 6. For random variables X,Y defined on finite sets X and Y, respectively, and for n ∈ N, and
 > 0, the conditional typical set of Y given a sequence xn is defined as
An (Y |xn) =
{
yn
∣∣∣1
n
|N(a, b|xn, yn)−PX,Y(a, b)|≤ ,∀a, b ∈ X×Y
}
,
where N(a, b|xn, yn) = ∑ni=1 1(xi = a, yi = b).
We will make use of the following well-known results.
Lemma 1. Let Xi, i ∈ {1, 2} be random variables defined on probability spaces (Xi, 2Xi , PXi), i ∈ {1, 2},
respectively. There exists a sequence k → 0 depending only on the cardinalities |Xi| so that for every
distribution P on X1 and stochastic matrix W : X1 → X2,
PXn1 (A
n
 (X1)) ≥ 1 −
|X1|
4n2
, P(An (X2)|xn1) ≥ 1 −
|X1||X2|
4n2
,
for every  > 0.
Lemma 2. Let Xi, i ∈ {1, 2} be defined as in Lemma 1. There exists a sequence k → 0 depending only on
the cardinalities |Xi| so that for every distribution P on X1 and stochastic matrix W : X1 → X2,∣∣∣1
n
log |An (Xi)| − H(PXi)
∣∣∣ ≤ n,∣∣∣1
n
log PXni (x
n) + H(PXi)
∣∣∣ ≤ n,∀xn ∈ An (Xi).
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We define three binary random variables, U, Y , and Z, where the random variable Z corresponds to a
specific entry in the adjacency matrix of g0, U corresponds to the entry in the adjacency matrix of g1, and
Y corresponds to the noisy response received after the query regarding that specific entry (i.e. Y is a noisy
version of Z.). More precisely, Z is distributed according to the Bernoulli distribution with P(Z = 1) = p.
The distribution of the random variable U given Z is PU |Z(α|β) = PE1 |E0(α|β). The distribution of Y given Z
is equal to PY |Z given in Equation (3). Define the joint distribution among the random variables (U,Y,Z) by
PU,Y,Z = PY PZ|Y PU |Z .
So, the Markov chain U − Y − Z holds.
We proceed to describe the strategy. We fix  > 0 and l, n′ ∈ N. The attack involves l steps. The first step
is similar to the previous two strategies. The attacker sends group membership queries corresponding to the
first n′ groups. Hence, it makes queries regarding the values of FJ,k, k ∈ [1, n′]. Note that in analyzing TSS,
in contrast with the previous sections, it is assumed that the attacker does not necessarily have direct access
to g0. Rather, it has access to the noisy graph g1. We denote the partial group signature of user J in g1 by
F̂n
′
J,k. The attacker receives a noisy version of the partial group signature F
n′
J,1. We denote this noisy vector
by F˜n
′
J,1. The relationship between F˜
n′
J,1, F̂
n′
J,1, and F
n′
J,1 is shown in Figure 5.
The attacker verifies that F˜n
′
J,1 ∈ An
′
 (Y). If F˜
n′
J,1 < A
n′
 (Y) the attacker proceeds to step two. Otherwise, it
defines the following ambiguity set:
L = {i|F̂n′i,n ∈ An
′
 (U |Yn
′
= F˜n
′
J,1)}.
Remark 2. When ei = fi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Un′ = Yn′ with probability one. So, the ambiguity set is the
set of sequences Un
′
which differ with Yn
′
in at most n′ elements. For small enough , this set is the same
as the ambiguity set in the MAP strategy.
Let L = {i1, i2, · · · , i|L|}. At time (n′ + t), the attacker makes a UID query about whether the user index is
equal to it. In other words, it transmits xn′+t = rn+it , t ∈ [1,m]. The algorithms ends when the attacker receives
the output zn′+t = 1. If the attacker fails to recover J in this step, it proceeds to the second step.
In summary, the attack strategy in the first step is characterized below:
xt =

rt if t ∈ [1, n′],
uit−n′ if n
′ < t ≤ n′ + |L| and yn′ ∈ An′ (Y).
The attacker fails to recover J if yn
′
< An′ (Y) or F̂n′J,n < An
′
 (U |Yn′ = F˜n′J,1). In this case, in step two, the attacker
eliminates the first n′ groups from the graph g1 and repeats the algorithm. This is repeated iteratively until
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Fig. 5: The figure shows the three different partial group signatures for the users. The partial signature from
the network graph g0 is denoted by Fn
′
i,1. The partial signature available to the attacker in graph g
1 is denoted
by F̂n
′
i,1. Finally, the partial signature received after the first step is Y
n′ = F˜n
′
J,1. The red bits are corrupted by
noise in the initial phase of the attack when the attacker scans the network. The green bits are corrupted in
the active phase of the attack when the attacker transmits queries to the network.
the lth step. If the lth step is reached, the attacker conducts an exhaustive search by sending all possible UID
queries until the de-anonymization process is complete.
Remark 3. The strategy is analogous to unstructured random coding strategies used for point-to-point
channel coding. In this analogy, the set of partial group signatures C = {F̂n′i,1|i ∈ [1,m]} resembles the
randomly generated codebook, the index J resembles the message index, and the sequence Yn
′
resembles the
sequence received by the decoder, where the codeword F̂n
′
J,1 is transmitted over the channel characterized by
the transition probability PY |U .
We denote the number of queries in this attack strategy by QTS S . The following theorem provides bounds
on the expected number of queries:
Theorem 3. For the TSS strategy, an upper bound on the expected number of queries is given by::
E(QTS S ) =
(
n′ + m2n
′(I(U;Y)±)) ( n′2
n′2 − 1
)
+
m
(n′2)l
+ O(1), (8)
where n′ ≤ n. If n′ , = 1I(U;Y)+ log m,  , =n
′− 13 and l , log mlog n′2 , we have
E(QTS S ) ≤ 1I(U; Y) log m + O(log
2
3 m).
This implies
lim sup
m→∞
∣∣∣E(QTS S ) − 1I(U;Y) log2 m∣∣∣√
log2 m
< ∞. (9)
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Proof. Please refer to the Appendix. 
Remark 4. In the noiseless case with ei = fi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, I(U; Y) = Hb(p). In this case, the expected
number of queries in the TSS strategy improves upon that of the MAP and GIS strategies.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced new mathematical framework for the active de-anonymization problem.
We have used a statistical model to capture the group membership behavior of the users in the social network
as well as to model partial information available to the attacker in active de-anonymization attacks. We have
investigated the minimum expected number of queries necessary for de-anonymization by analyzing the three
new attack strategies devised in this paper. We have shown that in all of these strategies the expected number
of queries grows logarithmically in the number of users.
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VI. Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that the attacker first selects n′ groups randomly and uniformly. After finding the partial group
signature corresponding to these groups. It then conducts a brute-force search over the intersection of groups
which the user is a member of to de-anonymize the user.
We calculate the expected size of the intersection of the groups of which the user is a member. Let
ri1 , ri2 , ·, rin′ be the groups that are queried by the attacker. Let L be defined as the size of the intersection:
L =
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
ik:u∈rik
Eik
∣∣∣∣.
We have:
E(L) = E
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
ik:u∈rik
Eik
∣∣∣∣
 = ∑
I⊂{i1,i2,··· ,in′ }
P (I = {ik|u ∈ rk})E
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
ik:u∈rik
Eik
∣∣∣∣|I = {ik|u ∈ rk}
 (10)
=
∑
I⊂{i1,i2,··· ,in′ }
P (I = {ik|u ∈ rk})E
∣∣∣∣⋂
ik∈I
Eik\{u}
∣∣∣∣ + 1 (a)= ∑
I⊂{i1,i2,··· ,in′ }
p|I|(1 − p)n′−|I|
(
(m − 1)p|I| + 1
)
(11)
=
n′∑
i=1
(
n′
i
)
p|I|(1 − p)n′−|I|
(
(m − 1)p|I| + 1
)
= (m − 1)
n′∑
i=1
(
n′
i
)
p2|I|(1 − p)n′−|I| + 1
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=(m − 1)O(√n′)2max0≤q≤1 −n′(q log2
q
p2
+(1−q) log2 1−q(1−p) ) + 1=(m − 1)O(√n′)(1 − p + p2)n′ + 1,
where in (a) we have used the fact that the presence of each edge is independent of other edges. Define
c = O(
√
n′) and d = O(1). The expected number of queries is given below:
E(QGIS )
(a)≤ E(q|C) + 1
mλ
′ log ( 11−p )
m = n′ + (
m − 1
2
)O(
√
n′)(1 − p + p2)n′ + 1 (b)= n′ + cm(1 − p + p2)n′ + d,
where in (a) we have used Equation (12) and the fact that 1p(1−p) log (
1
1−p ) > 1, 1 > p > 0.
Next, let
n′ =
 1p(1 − p) + 1log2 11−p
 log2 m. (12)
Then,
E(QGIS ) = n′ + cm(1 − p + p2)n′ + d
(a)≤ n′ + cm2−n′p(1−p) + d = n′ + cm2−p(1−p)(λ
′+ 1
log2
1
1−p
) log2 m
+ d
= n′ + c2
− p(1−p)
log2
1
1−p
log2 m
+ d = n′ + O(1),
where in (a) we have used the inequality (1 − y)n ≤ 2−ny, y ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Without loss of generality Assume that user uJ is to be de-anonymized. As explained above, initially,
the user’s partial class signature is determined in the first n′ queries. Hence, after n′ queries, the attacker
has access to the n′-length binary vector F′, where F′k = FJ,k, k ∈ [1, n′]. If there exists a unique user for
which F′ = Fn′j,1, then J = j and the algorithm stops (this is true since such a user would have the maximum
posterior probability among all users, so the corresponding UID query will be made first and the user is
de-anonymized). Otherwise, if there exists more than one user with partial class signature equal to F′, then,
the attacker proceeds to step two which involves transmitting UID queries corresponding to the maximum
posteriori probabilities. Due to symmetry, the maximum posteriori search over the set of users with partial
signature F′ is equivalent to an exhaustive search over these users. So, the attacker forms an ambiguity set
which contains all users which have the same partial class signatures. Then, it transmits queries corresponding
to the users in the ambiguity set.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that I = 1 (i.e. the first user is to be de-anonymized).
Formally, The attacker defines the following ambiguity set:
L , {ui|F′ = Fn′i,1}.
Let L be the set of users with non-zero MAP. Let the indices of users in the ambiguity set L be denoted by
{(i1), (i2), · · · , i(|L|)}. The transmitted symbol at the tth step is xt = ul(t)−n′ , t ∈ [n′ + 1, n′ + |L|].
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Clearly, E(q) = n′+ E(|L|)2 , where the first n
′ queries pertain to determining the partial class signature F′. For
the second term E(|L|)2 , we have E(|L|) =
∑m
i=1 P(J , i)P(ui ∈ L|J , i) + 1. Without loss of generality assume
that J = 1 and i , 1. Then, by similar argument as in Theorem 1, P(E|J , i, J = 1) = O(√n′)(p2 + (1− p)2)n′ .
Let E be the event that ui ∈ L, then:
P(E|J , i, J = 1) =
∑
F′⊂{0,1}n′
P(F′ = Fn
′
1,1 = F
n′
i,1) =
∑
F′⊂{0,1}n′
P(F′ = Fn
′
1,1)P(F
′ = Fn
′
i,1)
=
∑
F′⊂{0,1}n′
p2wH(F
′)(1 − p)2(n−wH(F′)) =
n′∑
i=1
(
n′
i
)
p2i(1 − p)2(n′−i)
(a)
=
n′∑
i=1
1√
λn′
2nHb(
i
n′ )
(
1 + O(
1
n′
)
)
p2i(1 − p)2(n′−i),
where in (a) we have used the following equality(
n′
i
)
=
1√
λn′
2nHb(
i
n′ )
(
1 + O(
1
n′
)
)
,
where λ = 2pip(1− p) and Hb is the binary entropy function. The proof of the equality follows from Sterling’s
approximation n′! =
√
2pine−n′n′n
′ (
1 + O( 1n′ )
)
. So, we have:
P(E)
(b)≤ O(n′) max
0≤q≤1
1√
λn′
2n
′Hb(q)
(
1 + O(
1
n′
)
)
p2n
′q(1 − p)2n′(1−q)
= O(
√
n′)2max0≤q≤1 n
′Hb(q)+2n′q log2 p+2n′(1−q) log2 (1−p)
= O(
√
n′)2max0≤q≤1 n
′(Hb(q)+q log2 p2+(1−q) log2 (1−p)2)
= O(
√
n′)2max0≤q≤1 −n
′(q log2
q
p2
+(1−q) log2 1−q(1−p)2 )
= O(
√
n′)2
max0≤q≤1 −n′
q log2 qp2
p2+(1−p)2
+(1−q) log2 1−q(1−p)2
p2+(1−p)2
−log2 (p2+(1−p)2)

= O(
√
n′)2max0≤q≤1 −n
′D(q|| p2
p2+(1−p)2 )+n
′ log2 (p2+(1−p)2)
(c)≤ O(√n′)2n′ log2 (p2+(1−p)2) = O(√n′)(p2 + (1 − p)2)n′ ,
where D(·||·) is the Kullback-Leibler Divergence. To show (b), let us define ti , 1√λn′ 2n
′Hb( in′ )
(
1 + O( 1n′ )
)
p2i(1−
p)2(n
′−i). Then,
max
i∈[1,n′]
ti ≤
n′∑
i=1
ti ≤ n′ max
i∈[1,n′]
ti ⇒ 1 ≤
∑n′
i=1 ti
maxi∈[1,n′] ti
≤ n′ ⇒
n′∑
i=1
ti = O(n′) max
i∈[1,n′]
ti ≤ O(n′) max
0≤q≤1
tqn′ . (13)
Also, (c) follows from the fact that divergence is positive. So, as n → ∞, we have E(|L|) → cm(p2 +
(1 − p)2)n′ + 1, where c = O(√n′). This completes the proof of (6) . To prove (9), let λ = 2p(1 − p) and
n′ = 1
λ
log2 m, then from (6) we have:
E(QMAP) ≤ n′ + cm2 (p
2 + (1 − p)2)n′ = n′ + cm
2
(1 − 2p(1 − p))n′ (14)
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(a)≤ n′ + cm
2
2−λn
′
= n′ +
c
2
2−λn
′+log2 m (15)
=
1
λ
logm +
c
2
2λ
1
λ logm−log2 m (b)=
1
λ
logm + O(
√
log2 m),
where in (a) we have used the inequality (1−y)n ≤ 2−ny, y ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N, and in (b) we have used c = O(√n′).
This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Fix n′, l ∈ N and  > 0. After n′ queries, the attacker has access to the n′-length binary vector F˜′, where
F˜′k = F˜J,k, k ∈ [1, n′]. The attacker checks the -typicality of the vector F˜′ with respect to the distribution
PY(·). Let B be the event that F˜′ ∈ An′ (Y). If F˜′ ∈ An′ (Y). Then the attacker finds all partial group signatures
F̂n
′
i,1, i ∈ [1,m] which are conditionally typical with respect to PU |Y given the sequence Yn
′
= F˜′. More
precisely, it forms the following ambiguity set, L = {i|F̂n′i,n ∈ An
′
 (U |Yn′ = F˜n′J,1)}. Denote the indices of users
in the ambiguity set L by {(i1), (i2), · · · , i(|L|)}. The transmitted symbol at the tth step is xt = ul(t)−n′ , t ∈
[n′ + 1, n′ + |L|]. Let C be the event that F̂n′J,1 ∈ An
′
 (U |Yn′ = F˜n′J,1). If the event B ∩ C occurs then the index
J is de-annonymized. Otherwise, the attacker removes the first n′ groups from the network and repeats the
TSS for the new network with m users and n − n′ groups. Let Qn,mTS S denote the number of queries in a TSS
for active attacks on a network with n groups and m users. Then,
E(Qn,mTS S )
= E(Qn,mTS S |B ∩C)P(B ∩C) + E(Qn,mTS S |Bc ∪Cc)P(Bc ∪Cc)
≤ E(Qn,mTS S |B ∩C) + E(Qn−n
′,m
TS S )P(B
c ∪Cc)
(a)≤ n′ + E(∣∣∣L∣∣∣∣∣∣∣B) + E(Qn−n′,mTS S )P(Bc ∪Cc),
where (a) follows from the fact that if B ∩ C occurs, then the algorithm ends in at most n′ + ∣∣∣L∣∣∣ steps, and
that the size of L is independent of the event F given event E. First, we derive bounds on E(∣∣∣L∣∣∣∣∣∣∣B):
E(
∣∣∣L∣∣∣∣∣∣∣B) = m∑
i=1
P(ui ∈ L
∣∣∣∣B) = E (∣∣∣{i|F̂n′i,n ∈ An′ (U |Yn′ = F˜n′J,1)}∣∣∣∣∣∣∣B)
=
∑
yn′∈An′ (Y)
P(Yn
′
= yn
′ |B)E
(∣∣∣{i|F̂n′i,n ∈ An′ (U |yn′)}∣∣∣∣∣∣∣yn′)
=
∑
yn′∈An′ (Y)
P(Yn
′
= yn
′ |B)E
 m∑
i=1
1
(
F̂n
′
i,n ∈ An
′
 (U |yn
′
)
) ∣∣∣yn′
=
∑
yn′∈An′ (Y)
m∑
i=1
P(Yn
′
= yn
′ |B)P
(
F̂n
′
i,n ∈ An
′
 (U |yn
′
)
∣∣∣yn′)
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= m
∑
yn′∈An′ (Y)
P(Yn
′
= yn
′ |B)P
(
F̂n
′
1,n ∈ An
′
 (U |yn
′
)
∣∣∣yn′)
= m
∑
yn′∈An′ (Y)
P(Yn
′
= yn
′ |B)
∑
un′∈An′ (U |yn′ )
P
(
F̂n
′
1,n = u
n′ |yn′
)
= m
∑
(un′ ,yn′ )∈An′ (U,Y)
P(Yn
′
= yn
′ |B)P
(
F̂n
′
1,n = u
n′ |yn′
)
.
= m2n
′(H(U,Y)±)2−n
′(H(U)±)2−n
′(H(Y)±)
.
= m2n
′(I(U;Y)±),
where for a function f (·) and , x, y ∈ R, we write y .= f (x ± ) to denote y ∈ [ f (x − ), f (x + )], and in the
last two inequalities we have used Lemma 2. Furthermore, P(E ∩ F) ≥ 1 − 1n′2 from Lemma 1. As a result,
E(Qn,mTS S ) ≤ n′ + m2n
′(I(U;Y)±) +
1
n′2
E(Qn−n
′,m
TS S ).
The attacker repeats this algorithm iteratively for l consecutive steps. Hence,
E(Qn,mTS S )
≤ n′ + m2n′(I(U;Y)±) + 1
n′2
n′ + m2n′(I(U;Y)±) + E(Qn−2n′,mTS S )n′2

≤
(
n′+m2n
′(I(U;Y)±)) (1 + 1
n′2
+
1
(n′2)2
· · · 1
(n′2)l
)
+
m
(n′2)l+1
≤
(
n′ + m2n
′(I(U;Y)±)) ( n′2
n′2 − 1
)
+
m
(n′2)l
.
For n′= 1I(U;Y)+ log m,  = n
′− 13 and l = log mlog n′2 , we have
E(Qn,mTS S ) ≤
1
I(U; Y)
log m + O(log
2
3 m).
This completes the proof.
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